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ABSTRACT
This study explores the corporate giving and financial performance nexus in tourism-related firms from four South Asia 
countries. Specifically, this study investigates if there exists an inverse U-shaped link between corporate giving and financial 
performance and assesses the potential bi-directional relationship between these two variables. Results generated from 
system-GMM estimator reveal that the effects of corporate giving on both ROA and Tobin’s Q are curvilinear. In particular, 
an inverse U-shaped relationship is observed, implying that firms are rewarded for their corporate giving engagement, 
which denotes “doing-good” leads to “doing well,” within a certain limit. Interestingly, this study also finds evidence 
that the firms which perform well financially are shown to engage less in corporate giving. Specifically, “doing-well” 
firms are shown to lead to lower level of “doing good,” supporting the management opportunity hypothesis. This study 
has policy implications in pushing for further CSR initiatives in other industries and emerging markets.
Keywords: Corporate giving; firm performance; bi-directional relation; system GMM
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini meninjau hubung kait pemberian korporat dan prestasi kewangan firma berkaitan pelancongan di empat 
negara Asia Selatan. Khususnya, kajian ini menyiasat sama ada hubungan bentuk-U songsang wujud di antara pemberian 
korporat dan prestasi kewangan dan menilai potensi hubungan dua hala di antara kedua-dua pembolehubah ini. 
Hasil dapatan yang diterbitkan daripada penganggar sistem GMM memperlihatkan bahawa kesan terhadap pemberian 
korporat terhadap kedua-dua ROA dan Tobin Q adalah garis melengkung. Terutamanya, kewujudan hubungan bentuk-
U songsang membayangkan bahawa firma mendapat ganjaran apabila berurusan dengan pemberian korporat, yang 
mana bermaksud “melakukan kebaikan” membawa kepada “memperoleh kejayaan” sehingga ke satu tahap tertentu. 
Menariknya, hasil kajian ini juga mendapati bahawa firma yang menunjukkan prestasi yang baik dari segi kewangan 
didapati kurang melakukan pemberian korporat. Terutamanya, firma yang “memperoleh kejayaan” didapati menjurus 
kepada “melakukan kebaikan” pada tahap yang rendah, yakni, menyokong hipotesis peluang pengurusan. Implikasi 
polisi kajian ini menyarankan penekanan seterusnya untuk initiatif CSR dalam industri lain dan di pasaran baru.
Kata kunci: Sumbangan korporat; prestasi firma; hubungan dua hala; sistem GMM
INTRODUCTION
Using empirical data from the tourism-related firms 
across South Asia countries, this study contributes to 
understanding how corporate giving (CG), part of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), affects a firm’s financial 
performance (FP). The topic of CG has become a central 
focus of businesses and corporations’ rejuvenation efforts 
since the past decade, where most of the firms have started 
to incorporate CSR practices and principles into their 
business strategies. From a firm’s perspective, wealth 
accumulation is its fundamental goal to achieve. If the 
engagements of CG contribute to firm’s fundamental goal, 
this practice may be embedded in organisational practices 
within the sector for their sustainable development. Hence, 
this raises an important research question as whether there 
is a causal relationship between CSR, in particular, CG, and 
firm performance. More specifically, will “doing-good” 
lead firms to “doing-well”?
The relationship between CG and FP has come 
under increased investigation, by both academicians and 
industrial practitioners (Brammer & Millington 2008; 
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Lev, Petrovits & Radhakrishnan 2010; Wang, Choi & Li 
2008). By conducting a meta-analysis, Orlitzky, Schmidt 
and Rynes (2003) supported a positive CG-FP link. On 
the contrary, Berman et al. (1999), and Seifert, Morris, 
and Bartkus (2004) reported an insignificant relationship 
between both variables. 
In evaluating the relationship between CG and FP, 
Wang et al. (2008) hypothesised that the CG-FP link 
should be curvilinear. According to their postulation, 
corporate giving are expected to contribute positively 
to firm performance, initially owing to favourable 
stakeholder reactions and the effect of managerial learning 
in organising these activities. These benefits would be 
expected to eventually level off at higher levels of CG. 
Meanwhile, while stakeholders placed fewer concerns 
on the managerial misuse of resources at low levels of 
corporate giving contribution, greater concerns about 
the potential for misconduct by managers arises when 
CG contributions become excessive. As a consequence, 
the agency cost ascends. Based on the above arguments, 
Wang et al. (2008) therefore proposed an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between CG and FP. 
Using a panel data set of 817 firms listed in the 
Taft Corporate Giving Directory over a 13-year period, 
Wang et al. (2008) revealed that corporate philanthropy 
contributes to financial performance only to a certain 
point, upon which increasing philanthropy has a negative 
effect on financial performance. Specifically, they detected 
an inverse U-shaped relationship between CG and return 
on asset (ROA), and between CG and Tobin’s Q. In other 
words, an increased CG can enhance ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
However, as the level of CG reached a certain point, an 
increase in CG could have a negative influence on ROA and 
on Tobin’s Q. The inverse U-shaped relationship between 
CG and FP are further supported by Chen and Lin (2015a) 
using a sample of 13 publicly listed tourism-related firms 
in Taiwan over the 1996 to 2011 period. 
The issue tends to be more complicated since, within 
the CG-FP literature, there is also an ongoing debate on 
the potential recursive relationship between CG and FP. 
In other words, there have been alternative perspectives 
on the direction of causality to be contrasted. 
This study aims to fill the above-mentioned gaps 
by investigating the symbiotic performance relationship 
between CG and FP in the tourism-related firms (airline, 
hotel and restaurant). Specifically, this study first attempts 
to examine the curvilinear relationship between CG and 
FP within the tourism-related firms across four South Asia 
countries. Moreover, it also explores the potential bi-
directional relationship between CG and FP, if any, an issue 
that prior research has identified as meriting attention.
This study is innovative in two respects. First, this 
study considers how CG in affecting the FP of publicly-
listed tourism-related firms in emerging economies, in 
particular, four South Asia economies. It is no doubt 
that tourism industry can help creating income and jobs 
which boost destination economies and raise standards of 
living, however, its adverse repercussions have exposed 
the industry to strong criticism. Initiatives for CSR in the 
tourism-related sector have been put forth over the past 
decade (Holcomb, Upchurch & Okumus 2007). Unlike 
the other industries, by its very nature, the corporate 
accomplishment of tourism-related firms relies heavily on 
customer capital. Fombrun and Shanley (1990) stated that 
while a firm required a long time span to build a favourable 
image; one unfavourable incident in one day can destroy it. 
Hence, corporations who fail to implement CSR practices, 
as noted by Aras and Crowther (2010), could lose their 
business opportunities and competitive advantage. The 
existing research on the effects of CG on FP have mainly 
conducted for developed economies, such as the U.K. 
(Brammer & Millington 2008) and the U.S. (Lev et al. 
2010; Seifert et al. 2004; Wang et al. 2008) and recently on 
Taiwan (Chen & Lin 2015a; Chen, Lin, Tian & Yang 2017; 
Wang, Chen, Lin & Hu 2019) and China (Wang, Miao, 
Chen & Du 2018). Limited research studies have examined 
if CG affects the FP in other emerging economies. 
It is observed that the CG in South Asia economies 
has grown phenomenally in recent decades. For instance, 
CG represents 0.3 and 0.4 percent of GDP in India, and 
the giving amount raised by 50 percent from 2011 to 
2012. This study therefore considers a unique data set 
from various emerging economies across the South Asia 
region for the period spanning from 2002 to 2014. The 
economies under study are Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka 
and Pakistan1. To the best of our knowledge, this study is 
a few exceptions which conduct cross-country analysis 
within the tourism context. 
Second, it is observed that apart from the mixed 
results evidenced in previous literature, many of the 
existing research do not take time dependence into 
consideration. It is, therefore, difficult to determine 
whether CG contributions (doing good) leads to higher 
performance in the market (doing well), or if financially 
successful firms (doing well) precedes firms to contribute 
more proactively in CG (doing good). To fill the gap, this 
study explicitly models the timing issues of CG and FP with 
well-established technique – dynamic panel. By doing so, 
it provides managers and practitioners with clear insight 
for better CSR practice among tourism-related firms.
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 
2 presents the relevant literature and hypothesis. Section 
3 describes the data, variables and model specifications. 
Section 4 presents the results and discussions. Section 5 
concludes. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT
Corporate giving (CG), as part of CSR, has been 
acknowledged by various stakeholders as a fundamental 
component for a firm’s success (Carroll 2004; Lee & Park 
2009; Porter & Kramer 2006; Vogel 2005). Corporate 
giving is the discretionary activity by corporations in 
which a portion of the profits or resources of firms are 
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contributed to the society or non-profit organisations. 
CG can be in the form of cash or in-kind gifts to support 
for various societal benefits, such as education, culture, 
minorities, healthcare and the environment (Godfrey 2005; 
Wang et al. 2008). 
CG may generate benefits to firms specifically by 
creating an overall positive reputation. A favourable firm 
reputation can enhance the ability of the firm to attract 
and retain a higher quality of human capital, higher 
customer and supplier loyalty, and increased firm sales 
(Peterson 2004). A positive reputation could reduce not 
only financial and operating risks (McGuire, Sundgren & 
Schneeweis 1988), but also social and environmental risks 
of firms (Sharfman & Frenando 2008; Vogel 2005), which 
in turn generate comparative advantages and subsequently 
improve the firm performance.
While CG has been viewed as an opportunity, it 
may also be a threat to a business. Critiques of CG, on 
the other hand, argue that social responsibility CG incurs 
business expenses (a direct cost) and thus deteriorates a 
firm’s competitive position (Friedman 1970). Apart from 
this direct cost, CG can breed additional agency costs, 
specifically, when managers or board of directors allocate 
excessive corporate giving for their own interests, even 
at the cost of shareholders (Barnett 2007; Wang et al. 
2008). 
CORPORATE GIVING AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE NEXUS
The existing body of the literature on CSR introduces three 
fundamental concepts: good management theory, social 
impact hypothesis and trade-off hypothesis. Based on 
good management theory, firms with good management 
are expected to pay attention to CSR dimensions, which 
lead them to a favourable performance later (Freeman 
1984; McGuire et al. 1988; Waddock & Graves 1997). 
The “social impact hypothesis,” as proposed by Cornell 
and Shapiro (1987), states that fulfilling the demands 
of stakeholders enhance a positive image of the firm 
which leads them to perform better (Freeman 1984). 
The trade-off hypothesis, on the other hand, posits that 
firms’ engagement in socially responsible activities incur 
costs which will reduce firm profits and shareholder 
wealth (comparative performance), implying a negative 
impact of CG on FP (Vance 1975). In summary, under the 
good management theory, social impact and trade-off 
hypotheses, CG would be a predictor of FP. 
Although the effect of corporate giving is recognised 
in literature, the CG-FP link, according to Wang et al. (2008), 
should be curvilinear. According to their postulation, 
although CG helps to reduce the firms’ risk exposure 
by securing critical resources controlled by various 
stakeholders, the benefits generated from excessive CG will 
be level off eventually due to constraints on stakeholder 
support. The positive effect will be outweighed by the 
ascending direct and agency costs. As a consequence, an 
inverse U-shape link is postulated between the corporate 
giving and financial performance. 
Contrary to the earlier arguments, slack resources 
theory and managerial opportunism hypothesis on the 
other hand postulate that firm’s performance leads the 
decisions on CSR. The “slack resources theory” assumes 
that firms which have superior performance will have more 
financial resource slack to invest in socially responsible 
activities including to make higher corporate giving 
(Waddock & Graves 1997). By contrary, managerial 
opportunism hypothesis proposes that when a firm is 
doing well, corporate managers may reduce spending on 
socially responsible domains in order to maximise their 
own interests (Preston & O’Bannon 1997). To sum up, 
according to the “slack resources theory” and “managerial 
opportunism hypothesis,” CG is determined by FP, not 
vice versa. 
The relationship between CG and FP has been studied 
in the various industries and different countries, however, 
the findings remained inconclusive (see Brammer & 
Millington 2008; Lev et al. 2010; Seifert et al. 2004; 
Wang et al. 2008). 
In the tourism research literature, with the exception 
of Chen and Lin (2015a) and Chen et al. (2017), majority 
of the research focused on CSR and FP and the findings 
are inconclusive (Garay & Font 2012; Kim & Kim 2014; 
Lee & Park 2009). In particular, while Garay and Font 
(2012) and Kim and Kim (2014) revealed that CSR enhance 
shareholder value of publicly listed tourism-related firms, 
Lee and Park (2009) found no relationship between the 
CSR and tourism-related firm performance. 
By utilising a sample of 13 publicly listed tourism-
related firms in Taiwan over the 1996 to 2011 period, 
Chen and Lin (2015a) supported the inverse U-shaped 
relationship proposed by Wang et al. (2008). A recent 
study by Chen et al. (2017) justified that the optimal level 
of a tourism-related firm’s CG is positively related to the 
total market demand and the competitive advantage of 
CG, and negatively related to the induced cost of giving 
practices. However, Chen et al. (2017) also emphasised 
that that a positive or neutral relationship between CG and 
firm performance depends on whether CG could induce 
a competitive advantage of brand differentiation and 
customer loyalty to increase profit. 
To date, however, the direction of causality remains 
an open empirical question (Brammer & Pavelin 2008; 
Chen & Lin 2015a). Do profitable firms are likely to have 
discretionary funds to contribute to CG? This question 
remains unanswered in the tourism research literature.
Recognising the abovementioned literature, this study 
posits that: 
H1a The corporate giving positively affects the financial 
performance
H1b The effect of corporate giving on financial performance 
is curvilinear (an inverse U-shaped)
H2 There is a bi-directional relationship between 
corporate giving and financial performance 
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DATA, VARIABLES DESCRIPTION AND MODEL 
SPECIFICATIONS
DATA AND VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
This study scrutinises the effects of CG on FP taking into 
account both linear and curvilinear relationships. The 
sample consists of 51 tourism-related firms. The data is 
obtained as follows. First, all the tourism-related firms 
listed on the four South Asia countries (namely India, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan) were identified and 
initially 99 firms were listed. Since the key construct of 
the study is corporate giving, those firms without reporting 
on this item were excluded from the final sample, and 
the final sample was narrowed down to 51 companies. 
Description of the sample companies can be found in 
Table 1. The data comprises an unbalanced panel and the 
period of investigation is the thirteen-year period from 
2002 to 2014. The data used were retrieved from the 
Bloomberg database. 
Four control variables, which are commonly used in 
the prior literature in examining the CG and FP, are included: 
firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), financial leverage (LEV) 
and growth rate of sales (SALESG). SIZE is computed using 
the natural logarithm of the total assets. It reflects the 
market power of firms and thus their ability to adapt to 
economic and social change (Chen 2010). AGE is measured 
as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the 
inception of the firm in the stock exchange. It proxies for 
firm’s maturity. SALESG, computed as the annual growth 
in total sales revenue, represents the growth opportunities 
of firm (Anderson & Reeb 2003). LEV, calculated as total 
debt divided by total equity, measures firm’s ability to 
meet long-term obligations (Ross, Westerfield & Jordan 
2008). A descriptive statistics for the data set is presented 
in Table 2. From the panel B of Table 2, it is observed 
that the correlation coefficients among independent and 
control variables are all well below the threshold of 0.80, 
implying that the multicollinearity is not a serious concern 
for this estimation (Damodar 2004).
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY
In testing the CSR (CG)-FP relationship, two popular 
approaches, namely fixed-effects (FE) and traditional 
instrumental variable (IV), are widely used in the literature. 
These techniques, however, have recently been criticised 
as there are not able to control for the dynamic endogeneity 
(Wintoki et al. 2012). In addition, Flannery and Hankins 
(2013) highlighted the difficulty in obtaining the reliable 
external instruments in applying the traditional IV 
approach. To overcome the above-mentioned difficulties, 
this study applied the two-step System GMM estimator 
(Blundell & Bond 1998) as it allows for “a short panel, 
a dynamic dependent variable, fixed effects and a lack 
of good external instruments” (Roodman 2006, 2009). 
Beyond that, unlike other GMM estimation, system-GMM is 
suitable to avoid magnifying gaps owing to the unbalanced 
panel (Roodman 2009). 
This study thus employs dynamic panel model 
estimator as propounded by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and fully developed in Blundell and Bond (1998) to 
examine the relationship between corporate giving and 
financial performance in these tourism-related firms. 
In order to achieve this, a framework dynamic panel 
regression model to capture the relationship between 
TABLE 1. Sample information
Country Tourism- Selected Sample % of
 related firms tourism- listed tourism-
 listed related firms related firms
Bangladesh 3 2 67%
India 77 35 45%
Pakistan 3 2 67%
Sri Lanka 16 12 75%
Total 99 51 52%
Note: Tourism-related firms under study are airline, hotel and 
restaurant.
Empirical studies examining the link between 
corporate social performance (including corporate giving) 
and financial performance have used different measures of 
financial performance. Among the measures of financial 
performance widely used are accounting-based measures 
of profitability, or market-based measures (Platonova et 
al. 2018; Waddock & Graves 1997). The assessment of 
financial performance of this study is conducted using 
both accounting-based and market-based indicators. In 
particular, return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q are used 
to represent the measures of accounting-based and market-
based performance respectively. ROA has generally been 
perceived in the literature as indicative of past or short-
term financial performance as it measures the performance 
focusing on a specified past accounting time frame. Unlike 
ROA, Tobin’s Q measures capture future or long-term 
financial performance (Platonova et al. 2018). 
The key variable of interest in this study is corporate 
giving (CG). CG refers to total amount of all donations 
as reported by the firm, it is computed as the ratio of the 
total value of CG to sales revenue. Figure 1 illustrates the 
distribution of the yearly corporate giving (in US$ million) 
for the firms under investigation.
FIGURE 1. The distribution of the yearly corporate giving
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where, CG, FP, SIZE, AGE, SALESG and LEV are as described 
in equation (1a). 
For corporate giving equation (equation 2), as 
corporate giving is closely dependent upon resources 
that are already available (Waddock & Graves 1997), 
lagged financial performance variable (FP
i,t-1) is used 
as a regressor. To capture the dynamic nature of the CG-
FP relationship, the lagged dependent variables, FP
i,t-1 
and CG
i,t-1, are included as one of the regressors in 
equations (1a,1b), and (2), respectively. The bi-directional 
relationship will be supported if (from equation 1a or 1b) 
and (from equation 2) are significantly different from 
zero. 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
Table 3 presents the results of various model specifications 
using system GMM estimators. Prior to the discussion 
on the empirical analysis, some diagnostic tests are 
scrutinised. To verify the validity of these assumptions, 
this study use Arellano-Bond test for no serial correlation 
in the error terms (AR(2)), Sargan test for the instruments, 
and Difference-in-Hansen test for additional moment 
restrictions. As shown at the bottom of Tables 3 to 5, the 
insignificant results of these tests implying that all System 
GMM equations are properly specified.
RESULTS OF THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
EQUATION 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the FP equation 
(measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q). Columns (1) and (3) 
TABLE 2. Summary statistics of study variables
A: Descriptive statistics
 CG ROA Tobin’s Q Size Age SalesG Leverage
Mean 0.123 4.323 1.516 3.384 2.481 13.544 2.328
Median 0.023 4.672 1.230 3.092 2.708 8.648 1.707
Maximum 2.901 19.166 4.968 7.677 3.296 179.555 21.762
Minimum 0.000 -25.073 0.274 0.321 0.000 -55.187 1.042
Std. Dev. 0.332 6.336 0.883 1.626 0.761 29.940 2.022
Observations 394 394 394 394 394 394 394
B: Correlation matrix
 CG ROA Tobin’s Q Size Age SalesG Leverage
CG 1.000      
ROA 0.100 1.000     
Tobin’s Q 0.069 0.475 1.000    
Size 0.215 -0.127 -0.100 1.000   
Age -0.058 -0.054 -0.080 0.205 1.000  
SalesG -0.111 0.040 0.110 -0.032 -0.240 1.000 
Leverage -0.171 -0.437 -0.194 0.258 0.226 -0.116 1.000
Note: CG = corporate giving/ sales revenue. ROA = net income/total assets. Tobin’s Q = market value of a firm/replacement costs of assets. Size = 
the natural logarithm of the total assets. Age = the natural logarithm of the years in which a firm is listed. SalesG = the growth rate of sales avenue. 
Leverage = total debt/total equity.
corporate giving (CG) and financial performance (FP) is 
specified as follows: 
FP FP CG Z
FP FP CG C
it it it jit it
it it it
= + + +
= + + +
− −
− −
α λ β δ ε
α λ β β
1 1
1 1 1 2 G Z






















X X= = −; hence
          (1a)
where: λ, β, and δ refer to vectors of coefficien s on lagged 
dependent variable, FPit-1, lagged of corporate giving 
variables CGit-t, and controls, Zit, respectively εit; denote 
the residuals; i indicates firms and t indicates period, and 
j is the number of included control variables. 
As described in the earlier section, FP represents 
firm’s financial performance and will be proxied by ROA 
and Tobin’s Q. CG is the corporate giving, measured by 
the total value of CG scaled by sales revenue. To capture 
the persistent corporate behaviour of involvement in CSR, 
this study follows Lev et al. (2010) and Chen and Lin 
(2015b) in using the lagged of CG, instead of current CG 
in modelling the CG-FP relationship. Four control variables 
(Z) considered in this study are: SIZE and AGE are firm size 
and age, respectively; SALEG and LEV are the growth of 
sales and financial leverage, respectively. 
To investigate if there is a curvilinear relationship 
between the CG and FP, Wang et al. (2008) and Chen 
and Lin (2015a) propose to include a quadratic term as 
below: FP FP CG Z
FP FP CG C
it it it jit it
it it it
= + + +
= + + +
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− −
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α λ β β
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X X= = −; hence
  (1b)
The inverse U-shaped relationship is supported if 
β1(β2) is significantly positive (negative).
In addition, to assess the potential bi-directional 
relationship between the FP on CG, the following corporate 
giving equation is developed:
FP FP CG Z
FP FP CG C
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X X= = −; hence
        (2)
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TABLE 3. Results of system-GMM of CG and CG2 on ROA and Tobin’s Q
                                Financial Performance equation
 ROAi,t ROAi,t Tobin’s Qi,t Tobin’s Qi,t
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
ROAi,t-1 0.743 (0.054)* 0.771 (0.000)*** – –
Tobin’s Qi,t-1 – – 0.455 (0.000)*** 0.477 (0.000)***
CGi,t-1 0.695 (0.043)** 2.865 (0.027)** 0.133 (0.459) 0.514 (0.088)*
CG2i,t-1 – -0.816 (0.068)* – -0.124 (0.052)**
Sizei,t -0.588 (0.026)** -0.813 (0.005)*** -0.081 (0.046)** -0.085 (0.047)**
Agei,t 0.910 (0.245) 0.627 (0.471) -0.197 (0.076)* -0.151 (0.149)
SalesGi,t 0.015 (0.000)*** 0.016 (0.001)*** 0.002 (0.055)* 0.002 (0.035)**
Leveragei,t -0.012 (0.940) -0.069 (0.589) 0.015 (0.358) 0.022 (0.272)
Constant 2.201 (0.280) 3.534 (0.063)* 0.787 (0.030)** 0.623 (0.063)*
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
# instruments 23 33 29 28
# groups 51 51 51 51
# observations 389 389 389 389
AR(2) (p-value) 0.241 0.267 0.777 0.815
Sargan test (p-value) 0.450 0.969 0.946 0.375
Diff-in-Hansen test (p-value) 0.178 0.507 0.367 0.148
Note: *, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1% significant level. Definition of variables is as reported in Table 2. The p-value reported AR(2) are 
for second order autocorrelated disturbances. Sargan test reports the p-values for the null that instruments are valid. Diff-in-Hansen test reports the 
p-values for the validity of the additional moment restrictions that are necessary for system GMM.
report the results for linear relationship as according to 
equation (1a) while columns (2) and (4) are with quadratic 
term as shown in equation (1b). 
As shown in column (1) and (3), the coefficients for 
CG are shown to be positive and significant at 5% level 
(β = 0.695, p = 0.043) for ROA but insignificant (β = 
0.133, p = 0.459) on Tobin’s Q. Hence, the positive and 
linear CG-FP relationship is only supported for ROA but 
not Tobin’s Q.
However, when the quadratic term is included 
(column (2) and (4)), results revealed that the key 
variables, CG, are shown to be positive and statistically 
significant for both ROA (β = 2.865, p = 0.027) and Tobin’s 
Q (β = 0.514, p = 0.088) equations, indicating that firms 
are rewarded for doing good. In their recent study on the 
CG-FP link, Wang et al. (2008) and Chen and Lin (2015a) 
both supported that engagements on CG lead to better FP, 
based on a sample of firms from hotel industry in the U.S. 
and Taiwan respectively. 
In other words, the CG contributions of firms are 
crucial not only for short term profitability but also 
for future prospective. According to Simon (1995), 
firms should consider CG a strategy of long-term 
competitiveness. Since the relationship between FP and 
CG is evidenced to be significant, tourism-related firms 
may consider embedding a multi-period giving strategy 
in organisational practices.
Besides the positive and significant CG, the coefficients 
for CG2 are found to be negative and statistically significant 
in both models (β = –0.816 for ROA and β = –0.124 for 
Tobin’s Q). Hence, instead of positive linear relationship, 
an inverse U-shaped link is supported. This finding implies 
that although market rewards firms for doing good, 
as CG continues to increase beyond the optimal point, 
the costs of social activities engagement surpass their 
potential benefits (Waddock & Graves 1997), and firm’s 
performance deteriorates. With that, these results concur 
the findings evidenced by Wang et al. (2008), Chen and 
Lin (2015a), Wang et al. (2018) that there is a curvilinear 
relationship between CG and FP.
Given the existence of inverse U-shaped, it would be 
crucial to discuss on the optimal CG point to understand if 
firms contribute too much or too little during the studied 
period. Based on the estimation provided, the optimal 
CG level which maximises the ROA and TQ are 1.76% 
(=2.865/(-0.816*2))2 and 1.20% (=0.514/(-0.124*2)), 
respectively. These figures are higher than the sample 
mean of CG for the studied firms from 2002 to 2014 (0.12% 
as shown in Table 2). More specifically, the size of CG that 
maximises ROA and Tobin’s Q is about 15 times and 10 
times that of the study sample mean, respectively. Hence, 
based on the sample period, while firms could do well by 
doing good, they seemed to donate too little to CG. To 
fully realise their financial benefits, firms may consider 
engaging more actively in CG. However, the proposed 
optimal points are averaged values of all 51 sample firms 
for the entire sample period. This may not be precisely 
applicable to each firm, and each firm is encouraged to 
seek its own optimal range for their social activities, if 
possible. 
Regarding control variables, firm size is shown to 
have a negative impact on both financial performance 
measures – ROA and Tobin’s Q, implying that smaller firms 
tend to be more profitable, be it in short term or future. 
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The significant positive relationship between the growth 
of sales and two performance measures, on the other hand, 
may imply that more profitable firms are high growth in 
nature. Firm age and financial leverage are not significant 
in affecting both financial performances. The lagged 
performance measures are highly significant, implying the 
dynamic structure of the financial performance.
RESULTS OF THE CORPORATE GIVING EQUATION 
The results of potential bi-directional relationship are 
presented in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
estimation results in which the financial performance is 
measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q, respectively. 
For the controls, results reported that none of them 
turn up to be significant in determining CG. The lagged 
CG, however, is highly significant in both CG equations, 
providing empirical evidence of the dynamic structure of 
corporate giving.
For robustness check, all models are rerun by 
including current and additional lags of key variables. 
Table 5 presents the findings. Panel A presents the results 
on FP equation (to test if the lags of CG lead FP) while 
Panel B reports the findings on CG equation (to investigate 
if the lags of FP lead CG). Consistent with results reported 
earlier, the estimation results suggest that the financial 
performance of tourism-related firms is determined by 
corporate giving. On the other hand, “doing-well” (more 
profitable) firms are shown to involve less in corporate 
giving activities. This suggests that the causality runs from 
CG to FP, vice versa.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study addresses two key questions: “How does CG 
relate to FP?”, and “Does CG precede FP, or, FP precede 
CG?” Based on the sample of 51 tourism-related firms from 
four Asia-Pacific countries, this study reports an inverse 
U-shaped link between CG and FP. Besides, the findings 
also conclude a bi-directional relationship between the 
two variables. Specifically, while “doing-good” (CG 
engagement) precedes “doing-well”, firms which “do 
well” lead to lower levels of “doing-good”. 
The findings have a number of practical implications. 
From a firm’s perspective, wealth accumulation is its 
fundamental goal to achieve. If the engagements of CG 
contribute to firm’s fundamental goal, this practice may 
be embedded in organisational practices within the sector 
for their sustainable development. Based on the evidence 
provided, managers may designate a portion of revenue 
for CG in order to enhance their financial performance. 
Specifically, given that the contribution of CG is not 
only significant to short-term profitability but also future 
growth prospects, structural CG and the use of in-kind 
contributions may be suggested as it may also be expected 
to reduce agency costs (Iatridis 2015). 
For investors and analysts, the finding may provide 
some insights in evaluating their investment portfolio. 
In particular, as the relationship between CG and FP is 
inverse U-shaped, investors or analysts may take note that 
CG contribution of firms can be value-enhancing only if 
marginal benefits generated is able to offset the marginal 
costs of these involvements. 
While this study provided a novel insight into the CG-
FP relationship, it has some limitations. One limitation is 
that the sample considered only the firms available under 
the Bloomberg database. Hence, neither small nor medium 
sized firms are included. Future work may consider 
revisiting the CG issues of these smaller tourism-related 
firms. Another possible limitation is that while there are 
In column (1), the coefficient of ROA is shown to be 
negative and statistically significant at 5% (β = –0.002, 
p = 0.020). The coefficient of Tobin’s Q, as shown in 
column (2), also revealed a similar pattern, where the 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 10% 
(β = –0.028, p = 0.056). Both of these significant results 
therefore suggested that the better the firm’s financial 
performance, the lower the corporate giving. This finding 
therefore reports a contradict view with the slack resource 
theory. However, this negative FP-CG link is consistent with 
the managerial opportunism hypothesis that managers may 
keen to improve the shareholders’ wealth by spending less 
on social activities engagement (Preston and O’Bannon, 
1997). Alternately, it implies that firms may spend less in 
social activities in order to use excessive cash for their 
growth potential. 
TABLE 4. Results of system-GMM of ROA or Tobin’s Q on 
corporate giving
                              Corporate Giving equation 
 CGi,t CGi,t
Variable (1) (2)
CGi,t-1 0.885 (0.000)*** 0.895 (0.000)***
ROAi,t-1 -0.002 (0.020)** - -
Tobin’s Qi,t-1 - - -0.028 (0.056)*
Sizei,t 0.008 (0.262) 0.004 (0.465)
Agei,t 0.008 (0.560) -0.001 (0.870)
SalesGi,t 0.000 (0.532) 0.000 (0.561)
Leveragei,t -1.004 (0.356) -0.004 (0.383)
Constant -0.013 (0.851) -0.009 (0.908)
Year dummies Yes Yes
# instruments 33 33
# groups 51 51
# observations 354 389
AR(2) (p-value) 0.447 0.650
Sargan test (p-value) 0.221 0.375
Diff-in-Hansen test
(p-value) 0.578 0.148
Note: As per Table 3. 
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different components of CSR, this study addresses only 
one aspect of the CSR activities, which is corporate giving. 
When CSR issues are concerned, different dimensions 
or tools may be used, such as ethical, corporate, social 
and environmental dimensions. These dimensions and 
their impacts on FP are worth studied in the future study. 
Finally, due to the data constraints, the bi-directional 
causal relationship provided in this study is limited to short 
lag period. Future work may consider not only short-run 
but also long-run causality among these variables when 
a larger sample size becomes available. 
TABLE 5. Robustness check
Panel A: Financial Performance equation
Variable ROAi,t Tobin’s Qi,t
ROAi,t-1 0.710 (0.000)*** -
ROAi,t-2 -0.092 (0.268) -
Tobin’s Qi,t-1 - 0.564 (0.000)***
Tobin’s Qi,t-2 - 0.102 (0.381)
CGi,t 2.362 (0.358) 0.429 (0.226)
CGi,t-1 2.325 (0.070)* 0.600 (0.032)**
CGi,t-2 1.272 (0.223) -0.203 (0.254)
CG2i,t -0.746 (0.346) -0.166 (0.136)
CG2i,t-1 -0.876 (0.020)** -0.232 (0.027)**
CG2i,t-2 -0.470 (0.168) -0.006 (0.879)
Constant 6.233 (0.025)** 1.349 (0.001)***
Controls Included Included
Year dummies Included Included
Lags of CG = 0 3.190 (0.050)**  2.620 (0.083)*
Sum of Lags CG= 0 6.370 (0.015)** 2.670 (0.079)*
Lags of CG2 = 0 3.240 (0.048)*** 4.340 (0.042)**
Sum of Lags CG2= 0 5.930 (0.019)** 5.140 (0.028)**
# instruments 42 41
# groups 51 51
# observations 309 309
AR(2) (p-value) 0.249 0.909
Sargan test (p-value) 0.827 0.964
Diff-in-Hansen test (p-value) 0.346 0.141
Panel B Corporate Giving equation
Variable CGi,t CGi,t
CGi,t-1 0.439 (0.000)*** 0.494 (0.000)***
CGi,t-2 0.207 (0.002)*** 0.205 (0.000)***
ROAi,t 0.004 (0.145) -
ROAi,t-1 -0.008 (0.099)* -
ROAi,t-2 -0.003 (0.364) -
Tobin’s Qi,t - 0.125 (0.079)*
Tobin’s Qi,t-1 - -0.139 (0.010)***
Tobin’s Qi,t-2 - 0.007 (0.782)
Constant -0.031 (0.532) 0.103 (0.221)
Controls Included Included
Year dummies Included Included
Lags of ROA = 0 2.890 (0.065)* -
Sum of Lags ROA = 0 5.550 (0.022)** -
Lags of Tobin’s Q = 0 - 3.760 (0.030)**
Sum of Lags Tobin’s Q = 0 - 7.040 (0.011)**
# instruments 38 39
# groups 51 51
# observations 353 353
AR(2) (p-value) 0.347 0.600
Sargan test (p-value) 0.143 0.206
Diff-in-Hansen test (p-value) 0.995 0.305
Note: As per Table 3. 
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ENDNOTES
1  South Asia refers to Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and 
Afghanistan. This study considers only four countries 
(Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) as the 
published data from Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and 
Afghanistan are not available.
2  For a quadratic model of yi = β1+ β2x + β3 x
2, the 
quadratic or turning point is obtained by solving 
FP FP CG Z
FP FP CG C
it it it jit it
it it it
= + + +
= + + +
− −
− −
α λ β δ ε
α λ β β
1 1
1 1 1 2 G Z
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